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Abstract. Dialogue games are two-player logic games between a Pro-
ponent who puts forward a logical formula ϕ as valid or true and an
Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach
is that it is a uniform framework from which different logics can be ob-
tained through only small variations of the basic rules. We introduce the
composition problem for dialogue games as the problem of resolving, for
a set S of rules for dialogue games, whether the set of S-dialogically valid
formulas is closed under modus ponens. Solving the composition problem
is fundamental for the dialogical approach to logic; despite its simplicity,
it often requires an indirect solution with the help of significant logical
machinery such as cut-elimination. We give a set N of dialogue rules
that is quite close to a set of rules known to characterize classical propo-
sitional logic, and which is evidently well-justified from the dialogical
point of view, but whose set N of dialogically valid formulas is quite pe-
culiar (and non-trivial). Its peculiarity notwithstanding, the composition
problem for N can be solved directly.
1 Introduction
Dialogical logic was developed by Lorenzen in the 1950s and by Lorenzen and
Lorenz in the 1970s [7,8]. Their basis is a two-player logic game between a
Proponent (P ) who lays down a logical formula ϕ and attempts to show, by
winning the game, that the formula is valid; the other player, Opponent (O),
disputes this. As with other logic games [3], less attention is paid to actual
plays of dialogue games than to the tree of all possible ways the game could go,
given an initial formula ϕ; of particular interest is the existence of a winning
strategy for Proponent, which specifies how Proponent can reply to any move of
Opponent in such a way that Proponent can win.
⋆ Both authors were funded by the FCT/NWO/DFG project “Dialogical Founda-
tions of Semantics” (DiFoS) in the ESF EuroCoRes programme LogICCC (FCT
LogICCC/0001/2007; LogICCC-FP004; DN 231-80-002; CN 2008/08314/GW).
Lorenz claimed that Lorenzen’s dialogue games offer a new type of semantics
for intuitionistic logic and asserts the equivalence between dialogical validity
(defined in terms of winning strategies for the Proponent) and intuitionistic
derivability [5,6]. Lorenz’s proof contained some gaps, and later authors sought
to fill these gaps; a complete proof can be found in [1].
Dialogue games are not restricted to intuitionistic logic. By modifying the
rules of the game, they can also provide a semantics for classical logic. The
dialogical approach can be adapted equally well to capture validity for other
logics, such as paraconsistent, connexive, modal and linear logics [4,9]. All of
these extensions of Lorenzen’s and Lorenz’s initial formulation of dialogue games
are achieved by modifying the rules of the game while maintaining the overall
dialogical flavor. In this paper we consider a different route: We keep the particle
rules unchanged and consider what happens when we remove structural rules,
rather than adding or modifying them.
The fact that there is no principled restriction on how the dialogical rules can
be modified naturally raises the question of when the set of S-valid formulas, for
a particular set S of dialogical rules, actually corresponds to a logic. That is, we
are interested in identifying desirable properties of the set of S-valid formulas in
order to give it some logical sensibility. One such desirable property is that the
set be closed under modus ponens: If ϕ and ϕ→ ψ are S-dialogically valid, then
so should ψ be. We propose to call the problem of resolving whether a set S of
rules for dialogue games satisfies this property the composition problem for S.
Given the aforementioned correspondences between dialogical validity and
validity in various logics, a number of dialogical rule sets S for which positive
answers to the composition problem already exist, since the sets of formulas valid
in connexive logic, various modal logics, etc., are all closed under modus ponens.
However, these positive solutions to the composition problem use a significant
amount of logical machinery, specifically translations of dialogical strategies into
derivations in some appropriate cut-free proof theory. These positive results are,
to some extent, unsatisfying because they require that one already have a proof
theory for the target logic in question, and that this proof system admits cut
elimination; in many cases one or both of these may be lacking. When possible,
we prefer direct solutions to the composition problem that, as far as possible,
work solely with dialogues and eschew bringing in outside methods.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide an in-
troduction to (propositional) dialogical logic. In §3 we discuss the composition
problem in more detail, relating it to the problem of showing that the set of
formulas is a logic, and give a dialogical definition of a new sub-classical propo-
sitional logic, N. In §4, we prove a number of results leading up to a positive
solution to the composition problem for N. Then, in §5, we prove some properties
about N towards locating it within the universe of known propositional logics.
We conclude in §6.
Assertion Attack Response
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧L ϕ
∧R ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ ? ϕ or ψ
ϕ → ψ ϕ ψ
¬ϕ ϕ —
Table 1. Particle rules for dialogue games
2 Dialogical logic
We largely follow Felscher’s approach to dialogical logic [1]. For an overview of
dialogical logic, see [4].
We work with a propositional language; formulas are built from atoms and
¬, ∨, ∧, and →. In addition to formulas, there are the three so-called symbolic
attack expressions, ?, ∧L, and ∧R, which are distinct from all the formulas and
connectives. Together formulas and symbolic attacks are called statements; they
are what is asserted in a dialogue game.
The rules governing dialogues are divided into two types. Particle rules say
how statements can be attacked and defended depending on their main con-
nective. Structural rules define what sequences of attacks and defenses count as
dialogues. Different logics can be obtained by modifying either set of rules.
The standard particle rules are given in Table 1. According to the first
row, there are two possible attacks against a conjunction: The attacker spec-
ifies whether the left or the right conjunct is to be defended, and the defender
then continues the game by asserting the specified conjunct. The second row
says that there is one attack against a disjunction; the defender then chooses
which disjunct to assert. The interpretation of the third row is straightforward.
The fourth row says that there is no way to defend against the attack against a
negation; the only appropriate “defense” against an attack on a negation ¬ϕ is
to continue the game with the new information ϕ.
These notions can be made precise as follows (following Felscher).
Definition 1. A signed expression is a pair 〈A, e〉 where e is a statement and A
is either P or O. A signed expression is said to be P -signed if its first component
is P and O-signed if its first component is O. Let δ be a sequence (that is, a
function whose domain is an ordinal) of signed expressions for some and let η
be a function for which:
– dom(η) = dom(δ) \ {0}, and
– for every n in dom(δ), the value η(n) is a pair [m,Z], where m is a natural
number less than n and Z is either “A” (attack) or “D” (defend).
Given such functions δ and η, the pair (δ, η) is a dialogue if it satisfies the three
conditions:
1. If n is even, then δ(n) is a P -signed expression and if δ(n) is odd, then δ(n)
is an O-signed expression.
2. If η(n) = [m,A], then δ(m) is a non-atomic formula and δ(n) is an attack
upon δ(m) according to the particle rules.
3. If η(n) = [m,D], then η(m) = [k,A], and δ(n) is a defense against the attack
δ(m) according to the particle rules.
If δ(0) is 〈P, ϕ〉, we say that the dialogue (δ, η) commences with ϕ.
These skeletal conditions say only that play alternates between Proponent and
Opponent (starting with Proponent at move 0), and that every move (except
the initial assertion δ(0)) is either an attack or a defense against some earlier
assertion.
Further constraints on the development of a dialogue are given by the struc-
tural rules. In this paper we keep the particle rules fixed, but we shall consider
a few variations of the structural rules.
Definition 2. Given a set S of structural rules, an S-dialogue for a formula ϕ
is a dialogue commencing with ϕ that adheres to the rules of S. Proponent wins
an S-dialogue (δ, η) if there is a k ∈ N such that dom(δ) = [0, 2k] and there is
no proper extension of (δ, η), that is, there is no signed expression 〈A, e〉 and no
natural number n such that δ could be extended to the domain [0, 2k + 1] with
the new value 〈A, e〉, with η likewise extended to have the value [Z, n] at 2k + 1.
Remark 1. According to this definition, if the dialogue can go on, then neither
player is said to win; the game proceeds as long as moves are available.
We can now define the notion of an S-winning strategy for Proponent.
Definition 3. A branch of a rooted tree is a maximal totally ordered set of
nodes that includes the root, where order is understood as the immediate ancestor
relation. The S-dialogue tree TS,ϕ for a formula ϕ is the rooted tree satisfying
the conditions:
– Every branch of TS,ϕ is an S-dialogue for ϕ;
– Every S-dialogue for ϕ occurs as a branch of TS,ϕ.
Remark 2. S-dialogue trees for non-atomic formulas can be quite complex, and
indeed it often happens that some branches are infinite. If all branches are infi-
nite, neither player wins.
Definition 4. An S-winning strategy s for P for ϕ is a rooted subtree of TS,ϕ
satisfying:
1. The root of s is the root of TS,ϕ;
2. Every branch of s is an S-dialogue won by P ;
3. If k is odd and a is a depth-k node of s, then a has exactly one child;
4. If k is even and a is a depth-k node of s, then a has the same children as
does the image of a in TS,ϕ.
Remark 3. Instead of saying “winning strategy for P” we simply say “winning
strategy”.
This definition says, in the language of trees, that a winning strategy for P is
a kind of function saying how Proponent can win given any move by Opponent.
Condition (1) simply says that the strategy begins at the beginning. Condi-
tion (2) says that the nodes of a winning strategy are all moves in a dialogue
game and that all ways of playing according to the strategy end with a win for
Proponent. Conditions (3) and (4) say that Proponent needs to have a unique
response to any move the Opponent could make in any of the dialogues that
occur as branches in the strategy.
Dialogue games can be used to capture notions of validity.
Definition 5. For a set S of dialogue rules and a formula ϕ, the relation S ϕ
means that Proponent has an S-winning strategy for ϕ. If 2S ϕ, then we say
that ϕ is S-invalid.
Note that, like usual proof-theoretic characterizations of validity, dialogue valid-
ity is an existential notion, unlike the usual model-theoretic notions of validity,
which are universal notions.
We now consider some example rule sets.
Definition 6. The rule set D is comprised of the following structural rules [1,
p. 220]:
(D10) P may assert an atomic formula only after it has been asserted by O before:
If δ(n) = Pa and a is atomic, then there exists m < n such that δ(m) = Oa.
(D11) If p is an X-position, and if at p− 1 there are several open attacks made by
Y , then only the latest of them may be answered at p: If n(p) = [n,D] and
if n < j < p, j−n = 0, η(j) = [i, A], then there exists q such that j < q < p,
η(q) = [j,D].
(D12) An attack may be answered at most once: For every n there exists at most
one p such that η(p) = [n,D].
(D13) A P -assertion may be attacked at most once: If m is even, then there exists
at most one n such that η(n) = [m,A].
Despite its apparent lack of logical meaning, the rule set D has the following
property:
Theorem 1 (Felscher). A formula ϕ is intuitionistically valid iff D ϕ.
The proof goes by converting deductions in an intuitionistic sequent calculus
to D-winning strategies (via tableaux), and vice versa. (The conversions are
computable.)
Definition 7. The rule set D+ E is D plus the following rule:
(E) O can react only upon the immediately preceding P -statement: If n in def(δ)
is odd, then η(n) = [n− 1, Z], Z = A or Z = D.
As Felscher notes, E implies D13, and, for odd p or n, also D11 and D12. What
is surprising is that we have that D ϕ iff D+E ϕ [1, p. 221]. Classical logic
corresponds to the rule set CL := D10 + D13 + E, that is, dropping rules D11
and D12 (though, again, the presence of E ensures that the effect of D11 and
D12 partly remains).
3 The composition problem
The composition problem for a set of dialogue rules S asks whether the set S of
formulas ϕ for which Proponent has a winning strategy in the S-dialogue game
commencing with ϕ is closed under modus ponens. That is, if Proponent has a
winning S-strategy for ϕ and one for ϕ→ ψ, can we prove that Proponent has
one for ψ? The composition problem deals with the composition of the set of
formulas which make up a logic. A positive solution to the composition problem
can be given by giving one to a related problem, the strategy composition problem,
which for a set of dialogue rules S asks, given winning S-strategies for Proponent
for formulas ϕ and one for ϕ→ ψ, can we compose these strategies into one for
ψ? Clearly, a positive answer to this problem will also be a positive answer to
the more general problem, but the reverse is not the case: It may be possible
that some set S of formulas is closed under modus ponens, but the winning
strategies which generate the set are not composable. That is, a positive answer
to the composition problem combined with a negative answer to the strategy
composition problem indicates the non-constructivity of the positive answer.
A uniform solution to the composition problem for a wide range of rule sets
S seems unrealistic. Even in specific cases, it is by no means clear how one would
go about giving a positive solution (though of course a single counterexample
suffices for a negative solution). The composition problem for a semantics is
closely related to cut elimination in proof theory: One often-utilized method
for proving a positive solution to what we are calling the composition problem
is to give a correspondence between winning strategies and proofs or tableaux
in proof-theory known to admit cut elimination [1,2]. However, when there is
no known proof theory for a logic characterized by some particular dialogical
semantics, such a solution may not be available.
The composition problem is closely linked to what is conventionally means
for a set of sentences to be a logic:
Definition 8. Given a language L, a logic is a set L of L-formulas which is
closed under modus ponens; that is, if ϕ ∈ L and ϕ→ ψ ∈ L, then ψ ∈ L as well.
We are not requiring that L be closed under uniform substitution. Defining ‘logic’
in this way highlights the importance of the composition problem: Solving the
composition problem for a given set L is a prerequisite for declaring L a logic.
And this definition of ‘logic’ helps bring to light our fundamental question: When
are dialogical “logics” really logics?
We are now in a position to define the logic that will concern us for the rest
of the paper.
Adding E to the rule set D did not change the set of validities: Both D and
D + E correspond to intuitionistic logic. A natural question then is whether the
same holds for classical logic: That is, whether D10 + D13 = D10 + D13 + E.
The primary result of our paper is to show that this identity does not hold. Our
counterexample is the logic N.
Definition 9. Let N = D10+D13. The logic N is the set of formulas for which
P has a winning N-strategy.
Surprisingly, not only will N turn out to be radically different from classical logic,
we show that it diverges considerably from intuitionistic logic as well.
Not all combinations of structural rules with the standard particle rules result
in a logic: There are (trivial) rule sets where a negative answer to the composition
problem can easily be given. For example, let CL′ be CL with D10 modified such
that Proponent is now allowed to also assert atoms in defense of disjunctions.
Then, CL′ p∨¬p and CL′ (p∨¬p)→ p, but 2CL′ p. The set of formulas CL′ for
which Proponent has a winning CL′-strategy is therefore not a logic. Thus, we
must justify our calling N a logic. In the next section, we prove that the solution
to the composition problem for N is positive, by giving a positive answer to the
strategy composition problem, and hence that it is closed under modus ponens
and it deserves to be called a logic.
4 A positive solution to the composition problem for N
In this section we prove the main result of the paper, namely, a positive solu-
tion to the composition problem for N. We begin with some results concerning
properties of winning N-strategies.
Theorem 2. Every branch for an N-dialogue tree that contains a defensive move
by O either terminates at an O-move, or is infinite.
Proof. If a branch of an N-dialogue tree contains such a node a but does not
terminate at an O-node, then P has a response to some previous assertion of O.
But in this case, O can respond to P ’s move by repeating the earlier defense of
a that occurs in the branch; note that D13 rules out only repeated O-attacks,
not repeated O-defenses. Thus branches containing a defensive move for O that
do not end with an O-move are infinite. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. No N-winning strategy contains a branch where O defends.
Proof. If s were an N-winning strategy with a branch that contains an defensive
O-node a, then, by Theorem 2, every branch of s containing a either terminates
at an O-move or is infinite. But since s is a winning strategy, there can be
no branches of s that terminate at an O-move, nor can there be any infinite
branches. ⊓⊔
The corollary implies that when every branch of the N-dialogue tree for a formula
ϕ contains a defensive move by O, then ϕ is N-invalid. The converse, interestingly,
fails: In the N-dialogue tree for (p → (¬q ∨ ¬r)) → ((¬p → ¬q) ∨ (¬p → ¬r))),
which is N-invalid, O never defends in any branch.
Lemma 1 (Weakening). If N ψ, then N ϕ→ ψ, for all formulas ϕ.
Proof. Let sψ be an N-winning strategy for ψ. The N-dialogue tree Tϕ→ψ for
ϕ→ ψ begins with P ’s assertion of ϕ→ ψ, followed by O’s attacking assertion
ϕ. These first two nodes of Tϕ→ψ themselves form a two-element chain, c. Carry
out the following modification on sψ:
– The root node r of sψ is an assertion by P of ψ, but it is neither an attack or
a defense, and it refers to no prior assertion. Change r so that it is now an
assertion by P of ψ, but it is now to be understood as an attack against move
1 (which, in the tree sϕ→ψ that we eventually define, will be O’s attacking
assertion ϕ against P ’s assertion of ϕ→ ψ);
– Every non-root node of sψ refers to some previous assertion number k; change
this to k + 2.
Call the result of this modification s′ψ. Let sϕ→ψ by the result of grafting s
′
ψ
to the end of c. Claim: sϕ→ψ is an N-winning strategy for P for ϕ → ψ. That
sϕ→ψ is a subtree of the full N-dialogue tree Tϕ→ψ with the same root should be
clear (the surgery we carried out on s was intended to ensure that). The more
interesting possibility that needs to be ruled out is that in Tϕ→ψ Opponent can
respond in more ways than were possible in Tψ. But this cannot be: D13 is still
in force, so that O can attack P ’s assertions at most once. This implies that O’s
attack against the initial assertion ϕ→ ψ cannot be repeated, so that any attack
by O must be against some assertion by P made at some depth ≥ 2 in Tϕ→ψ;
we need not consider defensive moves by O because of Corollary 1. It remains
only to show that every branch of sϕ→ψ is finite and terminates with a P -move.
But this is so because sψ has the same property. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3 (Characterization of implication). Every N-valid implication
ϕ→ ψ satisfies one of the following three conditions:
1. ϕ is atomic.
2. ϕ is negated.
3. N ψ.
Proof. Case (3) is just a restatement of Lemma 1. Suppose now that ϕ is not
atomic and ψ is not an N-validity. Proceed by cases:
– If ϕ is an implication α→ β, then the N-dialogue tree opens withO attacking
the initial statement by asserting α → β. In any N-winning strategy for
(α → β) → ψ, Proponent cannot attack O’s assertion of α → β, because
this leaves open the possibility of a defense by O, contradicting Corollary 1.
Thus, any winning strategy s must choose, for P ’s response to O’s initial
attack, to defend by asserting the consequent ψ of the entire formula, and no
branch of s can attack the antecedent implication ϕ → ψ. By renumbering
the reference labels for nodes of s below the P ’s assertion of ψ in the obvious
way (renumber k to k−2), we obtain a winning strategy for ψ, contradicting
our assumption.
– Likewise, ϕ cannot be a disjunction, nor could it be a conjunction, for similar
reasons: In any N-winning strategy s for (α ∨ β)→ ψ (or for (α ∧ β)→ ψ),
Proponent never attacks α ∨ β (respectively, α ∧ β), so we can recover from
s a winning strategy for ψ, contradicting our assumption.
The only possibility left is that ϕ is a negation. ⊓⊔
Remark 4. To illustrate cases (1) and (2) of this classification of valid implica-
tions, consider p→ p and ¬p→ ¬p. Illustrating (2), we have the more interesting
validities ¬(ϕ∧ψ) → (¬ϕ∨¬ψ) and ¬(ϕ∨ψ) → (¬ϕ∧¬ψ) (the only directions
of De Morgan’s laws that are N-valid).
Remark 5. These conditions are not sufficient: The implicational version of mo-
dus ponens, p→ ((p→ q)→ q), has an atomic antecedent, but is (surprisingly)
N-invalid.
From the Characterization Theorem, with the help of a few simple lemmas,
we can prove a positive solution to the composition problem for N:
Lemma 2. No atomic formula is N-valid.
Proof. By Rule D10, the set of N-dialogue trees for an atomic formula p is empty.
⊓⊔
Corollary 2. N is consistent.
Thus, the composition problem for N is not trivially solved.
Theorem 4. If N ¬ϕ, then ϕ is a negation ¬ψ and N ψ.
Proof. By cases:
– ϕ cannot be atomic, since no negated atoms are N-valid, by D10 and the
particle rule for negation.
– ϕ cannot be a disjunction α∨β because, once O attacks the negated disjunc-
tion by asserting α∨ β, the only response for P is to attack the disjunction;
O can (indeed, must) defend by selecting either the left or the right disjunct,
so by Corollary 1 no winning strategy exists from this unique initial segment
of the N-dialogue tree for ¬(α ∨ β).
– Likewise, ϕ cannot be an implication or a conjunction.
Thus ϕ = ¬ψ for some formula ψ. A winning N-strategy sψ for P for ψ can
be obtained by from a winning strategy s¬¬ψ for ¬¬ψ and noting that, by the
particle rule for negation, the winning strategy for ¬¬ψ begins with a unique
initial segment of length two, after which P asserts ψ, attacking O’s assertion of
¬ψ. Simply remove the root and its unique successor from s¬¬ψ, declare that P ’s
assertion at the new root is neither an attack nor a response, and is a response to
no move of O; then renumber the reference labels k on all nodes of s¬¬ψ by k−2.
This renumbering is coherent because neither P nor O can attack or respond to
moves 0 and 1, by the particle rule for negation and D13, so all reference labels
are at least 2. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5 (Composition). If N ϕ and N ϕ→ ψ, then N ψ.
Proof. By the Characterization Theorem 3, given that N ϕ→ ψ, it follows that
either
0 P ¬¬χ → ψ (initial move)
1 O ¬¬χ [A,0]
...
...
...
...
k P ¬χ [A,1]
k + 1 O χ [A,k]
Table 2. Branch of Tϕ→ψ where P attacks O’s double negation
1. ϕ is atomic,
2. ϕ is negated, or
3. ψ is N-valid.
Case (3) is the desired conclusion. Case (1) is impossible, in light of the assump-
tion that N ϕ, by Lemma 2, so the desired conclusion follows vacuously. It
remains to treat case (2). By Theorem 4, from N ϕ, it follows that ϕ = ¬¬χ
for some formula χ. The beginning of Tϕ→ψ can be found at the top of Table 2.
Since these are the first two steps of an N-winning strategy for P , the game does
not end here with O. If, in any branch of s, Proponent chooses to attack move 1
by asserting ¬χ as an attack on O’s assertion of ¬¬χ, then the dialogue would
proceed as in Table 2. Such a branch ends with O, so if there were an N-winning
strategy for P that begins in this way, then P must have a response. Proponent
cannot attack O’s assertion of χ at any further point of any branch that begins
this way, by Corollary 1. Thus, P must eventually defend against the attack of
move 1 by asserting ψ. We can conclude that P must actually possess a win-
ning strategy for ψ that can be obtained from s by simply removing all copies
of the two-step piece where P attacks ¬¬χ. Note that χ cannot be atomic, by
Theorem 4, since we are assuming N ¬¬χ. Thus, deleting all these copies of the
two-step exchange cannot affect rule D10. Rule D13 is preserved because if O
attacks a P -statement in the diminished game then the same P -assertion would
likewise be attacked multiple times in the original game. ⊓⊔
We have thus shown, via semantic means only, a positive solution to the com-
position problem for N and thus we can conclude that it is a logic. In the next
section we move towards characterizing what type of logic N is.
5 Properties of N
Having established that N is a logic, we next say something about what type of
logic it is, and how it fits into the scheme of known propositional logics. We give
some examples of N-valid formulas in Table 3. More generally, we know that
Theorem 6. N ⊂ CL.
Proof. Every D10+D13-strategy is also a D10+D13+E-strategy, by Theorem 1.
That the inclusion is strict follows from the fact that 2N (((p → q) → p) → p)
(Peirce’s law), which is classically valid. ⊓⊔
p ∨ ¬p ¬p ∨ ¬¬p
(p→ q) ∨ (p→ ¬q) (p→ q) ∨ (q → p)
¬¬p→ p p→ ¬¬p
p→ (p ∨ q) p→ (p ∧ p)
¬p→ (p→ q) ¬(p ∨ ¬p) → q
Table 3. Some N-validities
As a corollary, N is not a connexive logic. We also know that:
Lemma 3. N * IL and IL * N.
Proof. For the first claim, N p ∨ ¬p. For the second claim, IL (¬p ∨ ¬q) →
¬(p ∧ q), which, by Theorem 3 is not N-valid, since 2N ¬(p ∧ q). ⊓⊔
It follows from this that N is not a relevance logic, since these lie below IL.
Further, since N is neither sub-intuitionistic nor super-intuitionistic, but is sub-
classical, it lies in an interesting and as yet under-investigated part of the lattice
of propositional logics.
It turns out that although N ϕ∧ψ iff N ϕ and N ψ, and N ϕ→ ψ implies
N ¬ψ → ¬ϕ, these results and others like them do not hold when formulated as
object-language implications. For example, conjunction elimination (ϕ∧ψ → ϕ)
is not N-valid, and, even more surprisingly, given that N is closed under modus
ponens, neither the conjunctive ((p ∧ (p→ q)) → q) nor the implicational (p→
((p→ q)→ q)) version of modus ponens is N-valid. Thus, the fact that versions
of double negation introduction and elimination are both valid is noteworthy.
N shares many characteristics with known sub-classical propositional logics,
though it does not completely align with any of them. Like relevance logics,
arbitrary uniform substitution is not valid. Consider, for example, the N-validity
p → ¬¬p under the substitution of p ∧ p for p: The result of the substitution
is N-invalid, because the implication no longer meets any of the requirements
in the Characterization Theorem. Another failure of uniform substitution not
immediately given by the Characterization Theorem is the passage from the N-
validity p∨¬p to (p∧p)∨¬(p∧p). After O’s initial attack, in all branches of the
N-dialogue tree P either refrains from asserting ¬(p ∧ p) or asserts it at some
move. Branches where P asserts ¬(p ∧ p) do not lead to a win for P because,
after P ’s assertion of the negation, O must defend by asserting the conjunction.
This leaves P with two options: To attack O’s conjunction (and thus fail to win,
by Corollary 1), and simply restart the game by defending against the initial
attack (so that our analysis of the possible branches recurs, and P does not
win). Branches in which P refrains from asserting ¬(p ∧ p) are infinite because
the atomic formula p is never asserted by O, so the only way to play for P is
to infinitely repeat the initial defense against the initial attack, which of course
does not lead to a win for P . The fact that uniform substitution of, e.g., p ∧ p
for p in an N-valid formula ϕ is not validity preserving points to an curious type
of “resource sensitivity” in the logic; what is valid with some minimal amount
of information may fail to remain valid when more information are provided.
Thus, N is a type of substructural logic. Linked to this sensitivity is the fact,
illustrated above, that valid inferences cannot be chained together to derive new
validities.
6 Conclusion
By making a simple and intuitive modification of the usual rules for classical
dialogue games, we obtained a set N of dialogically valid formulas for which we
proved a positive answer for its composition problem, thus allowing us to call
N a logic. Our positive solution to the composition was proved directly through
semantic means; we worked solely with dialogue trees and strategies and did not
need to follow the usual detour through a cut-free proof system.
The logic N has a number curious features, including a lack of uniform sub-
stitution, and a failure to validate the implicational and conjunctive versions of
modus ponens at the object-language level—despite the positive solution to its
composition problem—which arise from the fact that if Opponent can defend
once, he can always defend. As a result, this logic privileges implications whose
antecedents are atoms or negations, which formulas either cannot be attacked
or whose attacks cannot be defended against. The logic lies below CL, but nei-
ther above nor below IL, and is of interest because it is neither connexive nor
relevant, two families of well-known non-classical propositional logics which are
not superintuitionistic.
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